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Abstract 
During the height of the exclusion era, when Asian 
immigrants were prohibited from naturalizing and becoming 
United States citizens, state and federal court judges around the 
country naturalized at least 500 Asian immigrant servicepersons 
and veterans. Between 1918 and 1925, Federal Bureau of 
Naturalization officials and state and federal court judges had to 
determine whether the military naturalization provisions enacted 
in 1918 included the same racial restrictions that the general 
naturalization provisions included. This Article tells the story of 
how these officials and judges navigated statutory text, 
congressional intent, and the reality of Asian immigrant 
membership in the United States Armed Forces to determine the 
role that race vis-à-vis military service should play in determining 
citizenship eligibility. 
The story of Asian immigrant naturalization between 1918 
and 1925 highlights a long-standing question within American 
citizenship and immigration law: how to measure an applicant’s 
adoption of and commitment to mainstream American values, 
norms, and practices. Are there accurate and reliable categories 
that measure cultural assimilation and allow for cost-effective and 
efficient decision-making? Alternatively, are categories sufficiently 
inaccurate and unreliable such that individualized assessments of 
specific cultural criteria offer the only legitimate approach? Based 
on administrative memos, state and federal court judicial opinions, 
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and newspaper articles, this article reveals how state and federal 
court judges struggled with this general question and how the 
Supreme Court resolved the split that existed across the country. 
United States naturalization law continues to require category-
based decision-making, and it is important that we similarly 
interrogate those categories to determine the extent to which they 




Between 1790 and 1952, federal law prohibited Asian 
immigrants from naturalizing to become United States citizens.1 
Yet, between 1918 and 1925, at least 500 Asian immigrants became 
United States citizens.2 State and federal court judges across the 
country granted these individuals’ naturalization petitions based on 
their service in the United States Armed Forces.3 The exclusion of 
Asian immigrants from naturalization was based on the idea that 
Asian immigrants were unassimilable—no matter how much time 
they spent in the United States, they would neither adopt nor 
commit to mainstream American values, norms, and practices.4 Yet 
 
 1. See 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795) 
(“[A]ny alien, being a free white person . . . may be admitted to become a citizen 
thereof.”); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (eliminating 
race requirements in naturalization laws); see also Yuji Ichioka, The Early Japanese 
Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa Case, 4 
AMERASIA J. 1, 1 (1977) (“Denied the right of naturalization, Japanese immigrants 
were so-called ‘aliens ineligible to citizenship’ for decades . . . until the McCarran Act 
of 1952 altered their legal status and finally admitted them into citizenship.”). 
 2. See JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN 
HISTORY: AN A TO Z REFERENCE FROM 1868 TO THE PRESENT 46 (Brian Niiya ed., 
2001). 
 3. See Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, Star Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1918, in 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, file 106799/926, entry 26, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Naturalization Administrative 
Files] (“Japanese, Chinese and Koreans, serving in the United States army or navy 
are eligible to become citizens of the United States.”); Memorandum from Deputy 
Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to Commissioner Richard K. Campbell 
(Dec. 24, 1918) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files) (supporting Judge 
Vaughn’s decisions to confirm citizenship); In re Saichi Shimodao at *8 (D. Terr. 
Haw.) (Mar. 17, 1919) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files) (“The 
petitioner is in the military service of the United States; and the provision of the 
seventh subdivision of the Act of May 9, 1918 authorize[s] his naturalization though 
he is of the Japanese race.”). 
 4. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING 
OF MODERN AMERICA 8 (William Chafe et al. eds., 2004) (“The legal racialization of 
these ethnic groups’ national origin cast them as permanently foreign and 
unassimilable to the nation.”); Angela M. Banks, Respectability & the Quest for 
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the enlistment and military service of Asian immigrants 
contradicted this assumption. Bureau of Naturalization officials 
and state and federal court judges were faced with this 
contradiction when hundreds of Asian immigrant servicepersons 
and veterans sought to naturalize pursuant to the military 
naturalization provisions in the 1918 Naturalization Act.5 These 
provisions appeared to repeal the racial requirements for 
servicepersons and veterans.6 Based on original archival research, 
this Article tells the story of how administrative officials and state 
and federal court judges navigated statutory text, congressional 
intent, and the reality of Asian immigrant membership in the 
United States Armed Forces to determine if Asian immigrants 
would remain “permanently foreign.”7 
One of the boundaries that separates citizens and noncitizens 
is culture—values, norms, and practices. Since America’s founding, 
naturalization eligibility criteria have sought to evaluate 
noncitizens’ adherence and commitment to mainstream American 
culture.8 Those criteria have included factors such as race, length of 
residence, knowledge of United States history and civics, and 
oaths.9 The story of Asian immigrants’ naturalization between 1918 
 
Citizenship, 83 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 39–44 (2017) (“Concerns about social unrest 
were most often expressed as concerns about the inability of Chinese immigrants to 
assimilate.”); Lucy E. Salyer, Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. 
Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935, 91 J. AM. HIST. 847, 848 (Dec. 2004) (“Such 
determinations often rested on the presumption that Asians would remain always 
‘yellow at heart,’ that they would not, and could not, assimilate.”). 
 5. See Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542–44 (1918) 
(expanding the race requirement for naturalization to Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and 
potentially “any alien” who served in the armed forces, which would include those 
who served and were of Asian descent); JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2, 
at 46. 
 6. E.g., In re Saichi Shimodao at *8 (“The petitioner is in the military service of 
the United States; and the provision of the seventh subdivision of the Act of May 9, 
1918 authorize[s] his naturalization though he is of the Japanese race.”); 
Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist to Secretary 
of Labor (May 11, 1921) (on file with Naturalization Administrative Files) 
(advocating for the 1918 Naturalization Act to be read allowing for the naturalization 
of United States veterans of Asian descent). 
 7. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8. 
 8. E.g., Deenesh Sohoni & Amin Vafa, The Fight to Be American: Military 
Naturalization and Asian Citizenship, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 119, 126 (2010) (citing 
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, 243 
(1978) (“Typically, the naturalization process involved a waiting period of several 
years, during which aliens served an apprenticeship to allow the individual 
immigrant to become firmly attached to the well-being of the Republic. This ensured 
that individuals could demonstrate their loyalty and allegiance, key qualities 
necessary for constructing and maintaining national unity.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 
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and 1925 highlights a long-standing question within American 
citizenship and immigration law: how to measure an applicant’s 
adoption of and commitment to mainstream American values, 
norms, and practices. Are there accurate and reliable categories 
that measure cultural assimilation and allow for cost-effective and 
efficient decision making? Alternatively, are categories sufficiently 
inaccurate and unreliable such that individualized assessments of 
specific cultural criteria offer the only legitimate approach? Based 
on administrative memos, state and federal court judicial opinions, 
and newspaper articles, this article reveals how state and federal 
court judges struggled with this general question and how the 
Supreme Court resolved the split that existed across the country. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents a brief 
history of the statutory law and case law that made Asian 
immigrants ineligible for naturalization and thus “permanently 
foreign.”10 Part II presents the history of military naturalization in 
the United States and examines the purpose of the provisions. Part 
III details the analysis that Bureau of Naturalization officials and 
state and federal court judges used to evaluate the legitimacy of 
various categorical eligibility requirements. Relying on plain 
meaning interpretations of the statute and congressional intent, 
many judges and administrative officials concluded that the 
statutory language clearly used race as a categorical eligibility 
requirement and that Asian immigrants were therefore ineligible.11 
The judges that naturalized Asian immigrant servicepersons and 
veterans relied on the same interpretive tools. However, they 
concluded that the statutory language was either similarly clear in 
eliminating the racial requirements or the text was ambiguous and 
 
596–99 (1906). 
 10. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8. 
 11. See, e.g., Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 412 (1925) (“The legislative 
history of the act indicates that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge § 2169, 
except in respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified service.”); United States v. 
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213 (1923) (“The words of familiar speech, which were used by 
the original framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whom 
they knew as white.”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding 
“white person” applied to the Caucasian race and did not encompass the Japanese); 
In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding a man of both Indian and 
African race did not constitute as a man of “African nativity” or “African descent” 
under the statute because “African descent must be shown to be at least an 
affirmative quantity, and not a neutral thing as in the case of the half blood, or a 
negative one as in the case of the one-quarter blood.”); In re Charr, 273 F. 207, 213 
(W.D. Mo. 1921) (denying Korean veteran of the United States Army citizenship 
because “the provisions of the draft law clearly did not contemplate the incorporation 
of those not eligible to citizenship into the land and naval forces of the United States. 
That such may have been inducted into the service through voluntary enlistment or 
inadvertence of draft boards cannot affect the purpose of Congress.”). 
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immigrant servicepersons and veterans should get the benefit of the 
ambiguity in light of their clear demonstration of loyalty and 
commitment to the United States.12 
The analysis provided in this Article reveals how citizenship 
decision makers have navigated the challenges associated with 
categorical eligibility requirements in the citizenship context. 
Categories vary in their accuracy and reliability, and the case study 
of the naturalization of Asian immigrant servicepersons and 
veterans illustrates that the inaccuracy and unreliability of race 
was recognized, even if not completely accepted, in the 1920s. 
United States naturalization law continues to require category-
based decision-making. It is important that we similarly interrogate 
those categories to determine the extent to which they accurately 
and reliably measure the intended naturalization criteria.13 
I. Permanently Foreign 
Between 1790 and 1952, Asian immigrants were what 
historian Mae Ngai has referred to as “permanently foreign.”14 
Immigrants who were able to enter the United States despite the 
Chinese Exclusion Act or the Asiatic Barred Zone created by the 
1924 Immigration Act were not able to naturalize and become 
citizens.15 Federal law prohibited the naturalization of Asian 
immigrants. In 1918, Congress amended the 1906 Naturalization 
Act to harmonize the provisions regarding the naturalization of 
immigrants serving in the United States Armed Forces.16 The 
language used in the 1918 amendments raised the possibility that 
 
 12. See, e.g., In re Mohan Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (1919) (holding that scientific 
studies of ethnology determined Hindus were of the Caucasian or Aryan race, and 
thus without more clarity from Congress, petitioner, a Hindu, would be admitted to 
citizenship). See In re Saichi Shimodao at *8; Letter from Richard M. Sato to Comm’r 
of Naturalization Richard K. Campbell, (Feb. 8, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization 
Administrative Files) (stating that Congress intended the 1918 Naturalization Act 
to reward aliens for their loyalty and service during World War I, and without 
further clarity, Judge Sheppard would continue to confirm citizenship to United 
States veterans of Asian descent). 
 13. See Banks, supra note 4, at 1–2 n.5 (discussing recent Executive Orders 
prohibiting Iraqi and Syrian refugees and citizens from entering the United States). 
 14. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8. 
 15. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61(repealed by 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)) (“That hereafter no 
State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all 
laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”); see also Ichioka, supra note 1, at 
2 (discussing how naturalization statutes barring Asians from citizenship “formed 
the legal framework of the Ozawa case.”). 
 16. See Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542–43 (describing 
procedures for naturalization of immigrant servicepersons). 
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the military naturalization provisions did not include racial 
prerequisites.17 In the midst of World War I, Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans seized upon this possibility and 
applied to become United States citizens.18 The manner in which 
officials within the Bureau of Naturalization and state and federal 
court judges responsible for granting or denying naturalization 
petitions decided Asian immigrants’ eligibility was tied to the 
historical treatment of Asian immigrants in United States 
naturalization law.19 The following sections provide a history of the 
prominent role race has played in U.S. naturalization law through 
federal statutes and Supreme Court cases interpreting the racial 
requirements. 
A.  Naturalization Statutes 
Naturalization law in the United States has sought to limit 
access to citizenship to those noncitizens who are least likely to 
threaten America’s political experiment and who would add “to the 
wealth and strength” of the country.20 Since 1790, in order to 
naturalize, an individual must have resided in the United States for 
a specified period of time, be a person of good moral character, and 
support the United States Constitution.21  Over the past two 
centuries, additional requirements have existed and some of them 
 
 17. See Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r of Naturalization Raymond F. Crist 
to Commissioner Richard K. Campbell, supra note 3; Letter from Richard M. Sato to 
Comm’r of Naturalization Richard K. Campbell, supra note 12. 
 18. See JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2. 
 19. Compare Thind, 261 U.S. at 215 (“This not only constitutes conclusive 
evidence of the congressional attitude of opposition to Asiatic immigration generally, 
but is persuasive of a similar attitude toward Asiatic naturalization as well, since it 
is not likely that Congress would be willing to accept as citizens a class of persons 
whom it rejects as immigrants.”), with In re Soon Nahm Ahn (D. Terr. Haw.) (on file 
with Naturalization Administrative Files) (“If it was not the intention of Congress 
thereby to provide equal treatment, or at least fair treatment for all aliens in our 
service, I am unable to perceive what Congress did intend.”). 
 20. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039–1040, 1111 (1790) (statement of Rep. Madison) 
(advocating for the naturalization of only economically attractive aliens); KETTNER, 
supra note 8, at 241–42 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1064, 1065 (1795) (statement 
of Rep. Smith). Kettner contends that in 1795 there was a shared assumption within 
Congress that a residence longer than two years should be required so that 
“prejudices which the aliens had imbibed under the Government from whence they 
came might be effaced, and that they might, by communication and observance of 
our laws and government, have just ideas of our Constitution and the excellence of 
its institution before they were admitted to the rights of a citizen.” Id. at 1065. 
 21. See, e.g., 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795) 
(creating a two-year residency requirement); 1795 Naturalization Act, ch. 20 § 1, 1 
Stat. 414, 414 (1795) (creating a five year residence requirement, a good moral 
character requirement, and a requirement to be “attached to the principles of the 
constitution of the United States . . . .”). 
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remain today.  For example, naturalization law has had an English 
language requirement since 1906,22 a knowledge of United States 
history and government since 1952,23 and racial restrictions 
between 1790 and 1952.24 Naturalization requirements 
operationalize the state’s conception of who should be full members 
of the polity and evaluate applicants based on their adoption of and 
commitment to mainstream American values, norms, and 
practices.25  The requirements “reflect deep-seated societal views of 
who belongs.”26 
Legislative debates during the 1790s reveal that members of 
Congress were concerned that America’s democratic experiment 
could be threatened by foreign residents’ values, norms, and 
practices.27  Members of Congress wanted to ensure that future 
citizens were “fit for self-government.”28 The naturalization 
requirements adopted at that time were viewed as limiting access 
to citizenship to those noncitizens who were unlikely to threaten 
America’s political experiment.29 The concern about new citizens 
threatening the political life of the United States expanded to a 
concern about American social and economic life as well by 1870.30 
Concerns about future citizens threatening mainstream American 
political, social, and economic life have been addressed by 
incorporating cultural assimilation requirements into 
naturalization law. 
 
 22. 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 
599(1906). 
 23. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–40 (1952) 
(creating a knowledge of history and government requirement). 
 24. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 103, 103 (instituting a race requirement); 1870 
Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870) (stating that “naturalization 
laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African 
descent.”). 
 25. See Banks, supra note 4, at 14 (“Senators Williams, Corbett, and Stewart 
believed that Chinese immigrants’ values, norms, and practices were incompatible 
with American democracy and mainstream American culture. They used these 
perceived differences as justification for denying Chinese immigrants access to U.S. 
citizenship.”); Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Takao Ozawa, Naturalization of a 
Japanese Subject, undated brief, JARP, JFMAD, reel 39) (explaining a Japanese-
American petitioner’s commitment to mainstream American values). 
 26. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, & 
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY 110 (West 
Publishing Co. eds., 7th ed. 2012). 
 27. See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 8, at 235 (exploring how “[s]uspicion of the 
foreign-born and a belief that citizenship conferred political rights combined to shape 
the development of a federal naturalization policy in the 1790s.”). 
 28. Banks, supra note 4, at 25. 
 29. See KETTNER, supra note 8, at 241–42. 
 30. Id. at 235. 
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United States naturalization law has conditioned citizenship 
upon evidence of a willingness and ability to adopt mainstream 
American values, norms, and practices.31 At times this condition 
has been explicit and at other times implicit. Naturalization 
requirements—such as demonstrating the adoption of “the habits of 
civilized life” or English language skills—are explicit cultural 
assimilation requirements.32 Racial requirements for 
naturalization represent implicit cultural assimilation 
requirements. These requirements use race as a category for 
evaluating values, norms, or practices rather than evaluating each 
individual candidate based on criteria that directly measure the 
desired values, norms, and practices. Other categories are used to 
measure cultural assimilation within naturalization law like 
military service, marriage to a United States citizen, and lawful 
immigration status.33 Each of these categories is viewed as an 
accurate and reliable measure of an individual’s commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law, belief in individualism, self-
sufficiency, Christian beliefs and morals, and English-language 
skills. These are values, norms, and practices that citizenship 
decision makers have deemed important for future United States 
citizens.34 
Members of Congress were doubtful that “the subjects of all 
Governments, Despotic, Monarchical, and Aristocratical, are, as 
soon as they set foot on American ground, qualified to participate in 
administering the sovereignty of our country.”35 Congress adopted 
naturalization requirements that would limit the ability of those 
without the desired political character to become United States 
citizens.36 Congress addressed this concern through two particular 
categorical requirements: length of residence and race. 
Residence requirements were used because there was a sense 
that time in the United States would allow immigrants to develop 
the desired political character.37 These concerns are evident in the 
 
 31. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–40 (1952). 
 32. See Banks, supra note 4, at 25–26, n.26. 
 33. See discussion infra Part II. 
 34. See Banks, supra note 4, at 25 (“Within the immigration and citizenship 
context, legal decision makers have emphasized six aspects of American culture as 
being imperative for future citizens to possess. They are a commitment to democracy, 
adherence to the rule of law, Christian beliefs and morals, English-language skills, 
self- sufficiency, and a belief in individualism.”). 
 35. KETTNER, supra note 8, at 240 (quoting Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts). 
 36. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–14 (discussing Congressional fear and bias in 
relation to the 1870 Naturalization Act). 
 37. See KETTNER, supra note 8, at 218 (describing how residence requirements 
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1790 naturalization requirements. Only a noncitizen who had 
resided in the United States for two years was eligible to 
naturalize.38 
Members of Congress had less confidence in the power of time 
to socialize non-White immigrants. Between 1790 and 1870 only 
noncitizens who were “free white person[s]” were eligible to 
naturalize.39 In 1870 this racial requirement was expanded to 
include noncitizens of “African descent” and “African nativity.”40 
Chinese immigrants became eligible to naturalize in 1942 but all 
racial requirements were not eliminated.41 Immigrants of color 
were viewed as having unchangeable and dangerous values, norms, 
and practices different from those of mainstream American citizens.  
No amount of time in the United States was thought to enable these 
immigrants to develop the desired political character.  This led 
Congress to make these immigrants categorically ineligible for 
naturalization, and thus “permanently foreign.”42 
In 1870, the perception that Black immigrants were 
permanently and dangerously different had dissipated, but it held 
steady for Asian immigrants.  That year, Senator Charles Sumner 
of Massachusetts moved to amend the naturalization law by 
removing the “white person” requirement.43 During the floor 
debates about this proposed amendment, Black immigrants and 
Chinese immigrants were discussed in great detail. Congress 
agreed to make immigrants of African nativity or descent eligible 
for citizenship but denied that opportunity to Asian immigrants.44 
 
existed when state law governed naturalization and they were based on the 
assumption that “the exercise of political rights required a clear and conscious 
attachment to and familiarity with republican principles.”); see also id. at 219 
(describing how time in the United States was thought to ensure “that those imbued 
with ‘foreign principles’ had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values, and 
modes of thought necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous, self-governing 
republican community.”); see also id. at 237 (quoting Thomas Hartley of 
Pennsylvania during the congressional debates in 1790 as stating that residency 
requirements were necessary for immigrants to develop “a firm attachment to 
government” and noting Michael Stone of Maryland’s argument for a residence term 
“long enough to guarantee ‘first, that he should have an opportunity of knowing the 
circumstances of our Government, and in consequence thereof, shall have admitted 
the truth of the principles we hold. Second, that he shall have acquired a taste for 
this kind of Government.”). 
 38. 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (1790) (repealed 1795). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See 1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870). 
 41. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
 42. NGAI, supra note 4, at 8. 
 43. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5121 (1870); see also Banks, supra 
note 4, at 11. 
 44. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–16 (discussing the proffered and actual 
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The legislative history for the 1870 Naturalization Act reveals 
significant misgivings within Congress about Chinese immigrants’ 
values, norms, and practices, and their ability to adapt to 
mainstream America.45 Concerns about an inability to assimilate 
led Congress to revise the naturalization law in a way that 
reinforced the permanent foreignness of Asian immigrants through 
the Chinese Exclusion Act.46 This act is generally known for 
prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States. The 
Act also stated: “hereafter no State court or court of the United 
States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict 
with this act are hereby repealed.”47 Despite the federal 
naturalization law limiting naturalization to noncitizens who were 
“free white person[s]” and those of “African nativity and African 
descent,” Congress doubled down on the permanent foreignness of 
Asian immigrants.48 
B.  Naturalization Case Law 
The 1790 Naturalization Act, the 1870 Naturalization Act, and 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 each utilized categorical 
eligibility criteria—specifically race.49 Asian immigrants were 
ineligible because they were not White. Yet it took a series of court 
cases to confirm that Chinese, Japanese, and Indian immigrants 
were not White and to explain why. As documented in Ian F. Haney 
López’ 1996 classic, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE, courts adopted two main strategies for determining whether 
 
reasons for denying Asian immigrants citizenship in the 1870 Naturalization Act); 
1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870) (“And it be further 
enacted, That the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African 
nativity and to persons of African descent.”). 
 45. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 239–240; NGAI, 
supra note 4, at 8. 
 46. See NGAI, supra note 4, at 8; see also Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 
§ 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61(repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 
163 (1952)); see also Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 124–25 (discussing how the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and other naturalization laws “reinforced the notion 
of Asians as intrinsically foreign.”). 
 47. Chinese Exclusion Act §14, 22 Stat. 58, 61. 
 48. See Banks, supra note 4, at 11–14 (describing how many senators did not 
believe that Chinese immigrants could assimilate while “there was overwhelming 
support for black immigrants to have access to naturalization.”). 
 49. See 1790 Naturalization Act ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (1790) (repealed 1795) 
(“Be it enacted . . . That any alien, being a free white person . . . may be admitted to 
become a citizen thereof.”); 1870 Naturalization Act, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 
(1870) (“And be it further enacted, That the naturalization laws are hereby extended 
to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”); §14, 22 Stat. 58, 61 
(“That hereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to 
citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”). 
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an individual was a “white person” as the phrase was used in the 
naturalization statutes.50 In the first approach, courts relied on 
scientific conceptions of racial classifications and concluded that 
those deemed Caucasian were “white persons.”51 The second 
approach relied on popular conceptions of Whiteness rather than 
the scientific classifications of Caucasian or Mongolian.52 
In 1878 the Circuit Court for the District of California was the 
first court to hold that Chinese immigrants were not White and 
were thus ineligible to naturalize.53 The court described petitioner 
Ah Yup as “a native and citizen of the empire of China, of the 
Mongolian race” and stated that the issue before the court was 
“whether the statute authorizes the naturalization of a native of 
China of the Mongolian race.”54 The court held that it did not and 
initially justified its decision based on popular conceptions of 
Whiteness. The court explained that: 
[T]hese words in this country, at least, have undoubtedly 
acquired a well settled meaning in common popular speech, and 
they are constantly used in the sense so acquired in the 
literature of the country, as well as in common parlance. As 
ordinarily used everywhere in the United States, one would 
scarcely fail to understand that the party employing the words 
‘white person’ would intend a person of the Caucasian race.55 
The court’s analysis then used the scientific approach to 
confirm the idea that an Asian individual could not be White. The 
court referred to racial classifications as defined in Webster’s 
dictionary, which referenced Blumenbach’s race-based 
 
 50. The case law focuses on defining Whiteness because only one of the 52 racial 
prerequisite cases litigated between 1878 and 1952 raised a claim that an individual 
was eligible based on being of “African nativity or African descent.” See, e.g. In re 
Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (holding that Benedito Cruz could not be 
naturalized even though his “mother is half African and half Indian and [his] father 
is a full blooded Indian” because if Cruz were “of one-quarter white blood and three-
quarters Indian, he could not be admitted to citizenship as a white person . . . . It 
would therefore seem entirely incongruous to reason that the words ‘African descent’ 
should be construed to be less exacting in denoting eligibility for naturalization, than 
the term ‘white persons.’”). 
 51. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996). 
 52. See Thind, 261 U.S. at 208–09 (“It is in the popular sense of the word, 
therefore, that we employ it as an aid to the construction of the statute, for it would 
be obviously illogical to convert words of common speech used in a statute into words 
of scientific terminology when neither the latter nor the science for whose purposes 
they were coined was within the contemplation of the framers of the statute or of the 
people for whom it was framed.”). 
 53. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224–25 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878). 
 54. Id. at 223. 
 55. Id. 
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classification system, and noted that “no one includes the white, or 
Caucasian, with the Mongolian or yellow race.”56 
Congress reinforced the court’s decision with the Chinese 
Exclusion Act in 1882.57 Yet the status of Japanese immigrants and 
Indian immigrants was still an open question. The Supreme Court 
held that neither group of immigrants were eligible for 
naturalization in 1923 and 1924 respectively. Through Ozawa v. 
United States and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the United 
States Supreme Court solidified the permanent foreignness of 
Asian immigrants by holding that neither science nor common 
sense allowed Asian immigrants to be White.58 Whiteness within 
United States naturalization law was used as a proxy for identifying 
immigrants who had the capacity to adopt mainstream American 
values, norms, and practices.59 Consequently, the holdings in 
Ozawa and Thind reaffirmed that Asian immigrants would be 
permanently foreign because they would remain ineligible for 
citizenship despite their individual characteristics. 
i. Ozawa 
In Ozawa v. United States, the Supreme Court was faced with 
deciding whether Japanese immigrants were eligible to naturalize 
based on being White.60 The Court focused on a scientific approach 
to Whiteness and rejected the idea that individual evidence of 
assimilation could be sufficient.61 This approach to viewing race as 
a fixed category rather than as a proxy for values, norms, and 
practices was reinforced in Thind and Toyota v. United States. 
Takao Ozawa came to the United States in 1894 as a child and 
resided in California.62 He was educated at the University of 
 
 56. Id. at 224. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach was a German social scientist who 
introduced a race-based classification system for humans. Raj Bhopal et al., The 
Beautiful Skull and Blumenbach’s Errors: the Birth of the Scientific Concept of Race, 
335 B.M.J. 1308 (2007). 
 57. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61 (repealed by 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
 58. See Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (“the appellant . . . is clearly of a race which is 
not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side. 
A large number of the federal and state courts have so decided and we find no 
reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by numerous 
scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review.”); see also Thind, 
261 U.S. at 208–09. 
 59. See Banks, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing how “culture is used to evaluate 
immigrant groups.”). 
 60. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189–190. 
 61. Id. at 198. 
 62. Id. at 189. 
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California, Berkeley and settled in Hawaii in 1914.63 On October 16, 
1914, Ozawa submitted an application for naturalization to the 
United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii.64 The 
United States District Attorney for the District of Hawaii opposed 
Ozawa’s petition because Ozawa was not a “white person,” but 
appears to have conceded that Ozawa “was well qualified by 
character and education for citizenship.”65 
There could be no doubt that Ozawa had adopted and was 
committed to mainstream American values, norms, and practices. 
In his brief before the district court, Ozawa explained, “In name, 
General Benedict Arnold was an American, but at heart he was a 
traitor.  In name, I am not an American, but at heart I am a true 
American.”66  He then went on to detail evidence of his assimilation: 
(1) I did not report my name, my marriage, or the names of my 
children to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu; 
notwithstanding all Japanese subjects are requested to do so. 
These matters were reported to the American government. (2) 
I do not have any connection with any Japanese churches or 
schools, or any Japanese organizations here or elsewhere. (3) I 
am sending my children to an American church and American 
school in place of a Japanese one. (4) Most of the time I use the 
American (English) language at home, so that my children 
cannot speak the Japanese language. (5) I educated myself in 
American schools for nearly eleven years by supporting myself. 
(6) I have lived continuously within the United States for over 
twenty-eight years. (7) I chose as my wife one educated in 
American schools . . . instead of one educated in Japan. (8) I 
have steadily prepared to return the kindness which our Uncle 
Sam has extended me . . . so it is my honest hope to do 
something good to the United States before I bid a farewell to 
this world.67 
The Supreme Court did not doubt any of this but noted that it 
was required to give effect to Congress’ intent.68 Congress intended 
that only “white persons” and individuals of “African nativity and 
descent” were eligible to naturalize.69 The Court focused its analysis 
on determining how to define Whiteness. 
 
 63. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 56. 
 64. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189. 
 65. Id. 
 66. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 80 (citing Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11). 
 67. Id. at 80 (citing Ichioka, supra note 1, at 11). 
 68. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 194. 
 69. See Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before 
the H. Comm. On Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 9–10 (1918) (statement 
of Raymond Crist, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Naturalization). But see Salyer, 
supra note 4, at 859–861 (discussing how Crist intentionally minimized the bill’s 
scope in his representations to Congress, and in fact remained an ardent advocate 
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The Court stated that the language creating the racial 
requirements in the naturalization law “import a racial and not an 
individual test.”70 The Court rejected using color as a basis for 
ascertaining Whiteness because it would be impracticable, “as that 
differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among Anglo-
Saxons.”71 Consequently, “to adopt the color test alone would result 
in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into 
the other, without any practical line of separation.”72 The Court 
similarly concluded that information about Ozawa’s actual 
assimilation was irrelevant. The opinion noted that “[t]he briefs 
filed on behalf of appellant refer in complimentary terms to the 
culture and enlightenment of the Japanese people, and with this 
estimate we have no reason to disagree; but these are matters which 
cannot enter into our consideration of the questions here at issue.”73 
The only matter for the Court to decide is “the will of Congress.”74 
There is no implication in the naturalization law or the Court’s 
opinion of “any suggestion of individual unworthiness or racial 
inferiority. These considerations are in no manner involved.”75 
Rather the Court is simply attempting to ascertain what Congress 
meant when it used the term “white persons,” and decided it meant 
Caucasian.76 
The Court acknowledged that the category Caucasian did not 
create “a sharp line of demarcation between those who are entitled 
and those who are not entitled to naturalization, but rather a zone 
of more or less debatable ground outside of which, upon the one 
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of which, upon the other 
hand, are those clearly ineligible for citizenship.”77 While the Court 
concluded that Ozawa was clearly not Caucasian, the Court would 
later struggle with what to do when scientific authorities and 
common understandings of Whiteness contradict each other. 
 
for the naturalization of Asian veterans). 
 70. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 197. 
 71. Id. (explaining that there were “imperceptible gradations from the fair blond 
to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued 
persons of the brown or yellow races.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 198. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 197. 
 77. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198. 
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ii. Thind 
On July 4, 1913, Bhagat Singh Thind arrived in the United 
States as a twenty-one year old graduate of Punjab University.78 
After his arrival in the United States, he served in the United 
States Army for six months at Camp Lewis.79 He obtained the rank 
of acting sergeant and was granted an honorable discharge.80 Seven 
years later, Thind became a United States citizen when Judge 
Wolverton, of the District Court of the United States for the District 
of Oregon granted him a certificate of naturalization.81 Thind had 
argued that he was eligible to naturalize because Indians from 
India were Caucasian and therefore, he was a White person eligible 
to naturalize.82 Judge Wolverton was not alone in concluding that 
individuals from India were Caucasian and therefore White.83 In 
fact, his decision was based on precedent. He cited three cases with 
similar conclusions and explained that he “was content to rest [his] 
decision . . . upon a line of cases which . . . are illustrative.”84 He 
noted that there were contrary decisions, but he explained that he 
was “impressed that they [were] not in line with the greater weight 
of authority.”85 
The United States moved to cancel Thind’s certificate of 
naturalization, claiming that he was not a White person and 
therefore was not “lawfully entitled to naturalization.”86 The 
government lost at the district court and the appellate court 
certified the question of eligibility to the United States Supreme 
Court.87 The Supreme Court agreed with the government and held 
that a “high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amrit Sar, 
Punjab, India” is not a White person, and is therefore not eligible to 
naturalize.88 
In Thind, Justice Sutherland (who had also written Ozawa) 
rejected equating Caucasian and White. Justice Sutherland 
explained that, “‘Caucasian’ is a conventional word of much 
 
 78. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 61. 
 79. In re Bhagat Singh Thind, 268 F. 683, 684 (D. Or. 1920). 
 80. Id. at 684. 
 81. See id. at 686. 
 82. LÓPEZ, supra note 51, at 61. 
 83. See Singh, 257 Fed. at 209; see also United States v. Balsara, 180 Fed. 694 
(2d Cir. 1910); see also In re Halladjian, 174 Fed. 834 (D. Mass. 1909). 
 84. Thind, 268 F. at 684 (citing Singh, 257 Fed. at 209; see also Balsara, 180 Fed. 
at 694; Halladjian, 174 Fed. at 834). 
 85. Thind, 268 F. at 684. 
 86. Thind, 261 U.S. at 207. 
 87. Id. at 206. 
 88. Id. at 206, 215. 
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flexibility, as a study of the literature dealing with racial questions 
will disclose, and while it and the words ‘white persons’ are treated 
as synonymous for the purposes of that case, they are not of 
identical meaning—idem per idem.”89 The Court applied a “common 
man” understanding to the phrase “white persons.”90 Based on a 
common understanding of Whiteness, the Court concluded that “[i]t 
is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical 
group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily 
distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country 
commonly recognized as White.”91 Consequently, individuals from 
India were not White persons and were thus not eligible to 
naturalize. 92 
As in Ozawa, the Thind Court rejected an individualized 
approach to measuring Whiteness. The Thind Court suggested that 
the white person requirement is a proxy for assimilation. Justice 
Sutherland explained that: 
[t]he children of English, French, German, Italian, 
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge 
into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive 
hallmarks of their European origin. On the other hand, it 
cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of 
Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of 
their ancestry.93 
The Court went on to explain that this was not “to suggest the 
slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we 
suggest is merely racial difference, and it was of such character and 
extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize it 
and reject the thought of assimilation.”94 Despite the Court’s 
concession that there was no question regarding Thind’s “individual 
 
 89. Id. at 208 (“In the endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute we must 
not fail to keep in mind that it does not employ the word “Caucasian,” but the words 
“white persons,” and these are words of common speech and not of scientific origin. 
The word “Caucasian,” not only was employed in the law, but was probably wholly 
unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute in 1790.”). 
 90. Thind, 261 U.S. at 214 (“What we now hold is that the words ‘free white 
persons’ are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the 
understanding of the common man, synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as 
that word is popularly understood.”). Compare id. at 208 (“we held that the words 
imported a racial and not an individual test and were meant to indicate only persons 
of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.”) (emphasis in original), with 
Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (describing that Caucasian was not “a sharp line of 
demarcation between those who are entitled and those who are not entitled to 
naturalization, but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground.”). 
 91. Thind, 261 U.S. at 215. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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qualifications,” there was no escaping that he belonged to a group 
that Congress had deemed unassimilable.95 
The Court’s opinions in Ozawa and Thind clarified that, based 
on scientific classifications and common knowledge, Asian 
immigrants were not White and were thus ineligible to naturalize. 
These decisions suggested that the individual characteristics of 
Asian immigrants were irrelevant for eligibility. Congress dictated 
that only White persons and persons of African nativity and descent 
were eligible to naturalize.96 Consequently, the Court’s role was 
limited to interpreting the term “white person.” 
By 1923, it was clear that United States naturalization 
decisions would not be made based on individualized assessments 
of loyalty and language skills.97 Such an assessment would only be 
available to individuals who fell within certain racial categories.98 
Congress and the courts concluded that being within the category 
of Asian provided sufficiently accurate and reliable information 
about an individual’s values, norms, and practices to make an 
individualized assessment unnecessary. 
II. Military Naturalization 
Another category that Congress viewed as useful for 
naturalization purposes was membership in the United States 
Armed Forces.99 While such membership did not provide automatic 
access to naturalization, certain assumptions about the time 
necessary to develop loyalty and adopt key mainstream American 
values, norms, and practices were relaxed. 
A.  Fast-Track Naturalization for Servicepersons & Veterans 
Military service has not only been viewed as a “duty and right 
of citizenship,” but also as a way for noncitizens to prove “their 
worth for citizenship.”100  Congress first provided a naturalization 
 
 95. Id. at 207. 
 96. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 190 (quoting Section 2169). 
 97. Thind, 261 U.S. at 207 (“The children of English, French, German, Italian, 
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our 
population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin.”); Ozawa, 260 
U.S. at 190 (describing Asian individuals as “having manners, customs and language 
which seemed strange, and unwilling to mingle with western people”). 
 98. Cf. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 192 (holding only those who are deemed to be “free 
white persons” are eligible for naturalization). 
 99. See Milita Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 594, 597 (1862) (eliminating certain time and 
residency requirements for applicants who serve in the United States Armed Forces). 
 100. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 125. 
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“fast track” for servicepersons in 1862.101  That year Congress 
enacted legislation stating that: 
any alien, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has 
enlisted or shall enlist in the armies of the United 
States . . . and has been or shall be hereafter honorably 
discharged, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United 
States . . . and that he shall not be required to prove more than 
one year’s residence within the United States previous to his 
application to become such citizen.102 
Since 1862, Congress has continuously provided a fast track to 
naturalization for servicepersons.103 Congress has viewed 
noncitizens willing to serve voluntarily in the United States Armed 
Forces as individuals who have “demonstrated the necessary 
qualities for national membership.”104 Military naturalization is 
also viewed as a reward to noncitizens who have been willing to 
sacrifice their lives for the United States. The court in In re Charr 
explained that the purpose of military naturalization provisions is: 
to reward those aliens who had entered the military or naval 
service of the United States, as therein described, by admitting 
them to citizenship without many of the slow 
processes, formalities, and strictness of proofs which were 
rigidly provided and enforced under the law affecting 
naturalization as it existed then, and as it exists now.105 
Military naturalization provisions eliminate or alter some of 
the substantive and procedural naturalization requirements.  For 
example, the Militia Act of July 17, 1862 and the Act of June 30, 
1914 allowed servicepersons to naturalize without a declaration of 
intention.106  Pursuant to then-existing law, individuals could not 
naturalize unless they had filed a declaration of intention to become 
a citizen three years prior to seeking naturalization.107 The military 
naturalization provisions eliminating the need for a declaration of 
intention allowed individuals to avoid the three-year wait before 
becoming citizens.108 Those provisions also occasionally shortened 
 
 101. Id. at 120. 
 102. The Militia Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 594, 597 (1862). The standard residence 
requirement was five years.  Naturalization Law of 1802, 2 Stat. 153, § 1 (1802). 
 103. Cf. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8 (tracking the history of military 
naturalization for non-citizen Asian veterans). 
 104. Id. at 126. 
 105. In re Charr, 273 F. at 210–11 
 106. 63 Cong. Ch. 130, June 30, 1914, 38 Stat. 392, 395; Militia Act, 12 Stat. 594, 
§ 21. 
 107. 1906 Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 59-338, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, 596–99 
(1906); Naturalization Law of 1802, 2 Stat. 153, § 1 (1802). 
 108. Cf. 38 Stat. 392, 395 (allowing applicants to forego “proof of residence on 
shore.”); 12 Stat. 594, § 21 (“[H]e shall not be required to prove more than one year’s 
residence within the United States previous to his application to become such 
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the length of time that one had to reside in the United States. For 
example, the Act of July 17, 1862 only required one year of residence 
and the Act of July 19, 1919 did not have a residency 
requirement.109 At the time that both of these provisions were 
enacted, the general naturalization laws required five years of 
residency.110 Citizenship scholars and historians have noted that 
residence periods have been a feature of United States 
naturalization law as an “‘apprenticeship’ to allow the individual 
immigrant to become firmly attached to the well-being of the 
Republic.”111  Sufficient residence was viewed as ensuring that 
future citizens were loyal, which was a key quality to “community 
security.”112 Shorter residence periods were justified for 
servicepersons and veterans because “[m]ilitary service was seen as 
more than adequately demonstrating these normative qualities.”113  
Hundreds of Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans 
voluntarily served in the United States Armed Forces during World 
War I.114 They served out of a sense of duty to the country they 
viewed as their own, and many hoped that the presumptions about 
military service and cultural assimilation would extend to them. 
B.  Asian Immigrant Military Service 
In need of “quickly raising and training a modern national 
army with the capability of fighting abroad,” the United States 
government has frequently targeted immigrants for military 
recruitment.115 Asian immigrants responded to these recruitment 
efforts during World War I and approximately one thousand Asian 
immigrants volunteered for military service.116 Due to the 
prohibition on Asian immigrant naturalization, judges and 
administrative officials were faced with determining whether the 
general prohibition against non-White and non-Black immigrant 
naturalization applied to the military naturalization provisions. 
 
citizen.”). 
 109. Act of July 19, 1919, ch. 24, 41 Stat 222; Militia Act, 12 Stat. 594, § 21. 
 110. 1906 Naturalization Act, 34 Stat. 596, 596–98; Naturalization Law of 1802, 
2 Stat. 153, § 1. 
 111. KETTNER, supra note 8, at 243. 
 112. Id. at 10. 
 113. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 126. 
 114. See Salyer, supra note 4, at 854 (detailing how many Asian immigrants were 
eligible for the draft in 1917). 
 115. Id. at 851. 
 116. Id.; Harry Maxwell Naka, The Naturalization of Japanese War Veterans of 
the World War Forces 40 (1939) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California). 
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Most judges concluded that the statutory language was clear—
it either prohibited Asian immigrant naturalization or it had no 
racial requirements.117 The congressional intent analysis that 
judges and administrative officials conducted reflected strong 
disagreement about how Congress viewed military service and 
other naturalization criteria vis-à-vis race as a tool for measuring 
citizenship eligibility.118 The judges that naturalized at least 500 
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans between 1918 and 
1925 concluded that Congress viewed the specific practice of 
military service as a better measure of assimilation than race.119 
Yet the Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota v. United States 
reinforced the idea that Congress concluded that race was a better 
indication of cultural compatibility despite specific evidence of 
mainstream American cultural practices.120 
III. Measuring American Values, Norms, & Practices 
With the enactment of the 1918 Naturalization Act, immigrant 
members of the United States Armed Forces and veterans had a 
clear and uniform fast track to citizenship. As noted in Part II, this 
fast track was partially based on the idea that military service was 
an excellent proxy for loyalty and the other characteristics deemed 
desirable for United States citizenship. Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans sought to take advantage of these new 
naturalization provisions because they appeared to eliminate the 
racial requirements.121 This Part analyzes the various strategies 
that Bureau of Naturalization officials and state and federal judges 
used to interpret the 1918 Naturalization Act. All officials and 
judges began by attempting to determine the plain meaning of the 
statutory text, but some found the text ambiguous.122  Approaches 
to determining congressional intent varied. Some decision makers 
focused on the history of congressional action in the area of 
naturalization while others attempted to ascertain the normative 
 
 117. Compare In re Charr, 273 F. at 214 (“The words ‘any person of foreign birth’ 
occurring in the Act of July 19, supra, do not enlarge the word ‘alien’ as contemplated 
by these acts.”) with Thind, 268 F. at 685 (“I see no analogy in this act to the Chinese 
Exclusion Act.”). 
 118. Sohoni & Vafa, supra note 8, at 142–44 (tracking the history of judicial 
interpretation of Congressional intent). 
 119. JAPANESE AM. NAT’L MUSEUM, supra note 2, at 46. 
 120. Salyer, supra note 4, at 865. 
 121. Memorandum from Deputy Comm’r Raymond F. Crist to Comm’n Richard K. 
Campbell 1 (Jan. 22, 1919) (on file with the Naturalization Administrative Files); 
Japanese in Army Entitled to Citizenship, supra note 3. This textual reading is 
addressed further in Section III.A.ii.a. 
 122. See, e.g., In re Charr, 273 F. at 210–12 (discussing the ambiguity of the Act) 
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goals of the military naturalization provisions and extrapolate from 
there. In Toyota v. United States, the Court used the former 
approach to conclude that Congress intended for the racial 
requirements to apply to the military naturalization provisions.123 
The Court’s holding reinforced the use of race as a categorical 
eligibility requirement, which foreclosed the possibility that Asian 
immigrants would have the opportunity to demonstrate their 
individual worthiness of United States citizenship. 
A.  1918 Naturalization Act 
In 1918, Congress revised the 1906 Naturalization Act to 
harmonize the naturalization rules for immigrants serving in 
different branches of the United States Armed Forces.124 To 
facilitate this goal, the seventh subdivision was proposed as an 
addition to the 1906 Naturalization Act. The seventh subdivision 
provided a legal basis for the naturalization of noncitizens who had 
served in the various branches of the United States Armed 
Forces.125 Noncitizens who served in one of the specified capacities 
were not required to file a declaration of intention to become a 
citizen or to prove five years of residence within the United 
States.126 
The seventh subdivision did not include any racial 
requirements.127 Rather, the 1918 Naturalization Act included the 
 
 123. See Toyota, 268 U.S. at 412 (holding the Congressional intent “was not to 
enlarge § 2169”). 
 124. Amendments to the Naturalization Laws: Hearing on H.R. 10694 Before the 
H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 65th Cong. 3-4 (1918) (explaining the 
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States of more than twenty tons burden . . . .”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 542 (opening military naturalization to “any alien”). 
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following language: “nothing in this Act shall repeal or in any way 
enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the Revised 
Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this Act 
and under the limitation therein defined.”128 This was often referred 
to as a limited repeal of section 2169,129 which had limited the 
naturalization provisions to “aliens being free white persons, and to 
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”130 
When courts and the Bureau of Naturalization were faced with 
naturalization applications from Asian immigrant servicepersons 
and veterans, they were confronted with a challenging statutory 
interpretation question. The seventh subdivision not only used the 
term “any alien,” it also specifically provided for the naturalization 
of “[a]ny native-born Filipino” and “any Porto Rican not a citizen of 
the United States.”131 Bureau of Naturalization Commissioner 
Richard K. Campbell and a number of judges interpreted the repeal 
of section 2169 as only applying to Filipino and Puerto Rican 
noncitizens.132 They did not interpret the section 2169 limited 
repeal as applying to the language “any alien” within the seventh 
subdivision.133 The seventh subdivision in relevant part stated: 
Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and 
upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of 
the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist 
in [specified military service] . . . ; or any alien, or any Porto 
Rican not a citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-
one years and upward who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist 
in or enter [specified military service] . . . may, on presentation 
of the required declaration of intention petition for 
naturalization without proof of the required five 
years’ residence within the United States if upon examination 
by the representative of the Bureau of Naturalization, in 
accordance with the requirements of this subdivision it is 
shown that such residence can not be established; any alien 
serving in the military or naval service of the United States 
during the time this country is engaged in the present war may 
file his petition for naturalization without proof of the required 
five years’ residence within the United States . . . .134 
 
 128. Id. at 547 
 129. Id. 
 130. In re Knight, 171 F. 299, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (quoting Act of Feb. 18, 1875, 
ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318). 
 131. Naturalization Act of 1918, ch. 69, § 7, 40 Stat. 542, 542. 
 132. Memorandum from Comm’r Richard K. Campbell 3 (Apr. 2, 1919) (on file in 
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Other naturalization decision makers like Judge Horace W. 
Vaughan of the United States District Court for Hawaii and Bureau 
of Naturalization Deputy Commissioner Raymond Crist concluded 
that the limited repeal of section 2169 applied to the term “any 
alien” as it appeared within the seventh subdivision.135 Their 
conclusions often turned on how they believed Congress viewed 
Asian immigrants.136 
Judges and administrative officials can only naturalize 
individuals who satisfy the criteria established by Congress. Was 
the military service provided by these immigrants sufficient 
evidence of their commitment to and adoption of mainstream 
American values, norms, and practices?  Or did their race and 
ethnicity create a presumption of unassimilability that could not be 
overcome?  If Congress answered yes to the first question, then the 
limited repeal of section 2169 should be read as applying to the term 
“any alien” appearing in the seventh subdivision.  However, if 
Congress answered yes to the second question, then the repeal of 
section 2169 would be limited to Filipino and Puerto Rican 
servicepersons and veterans. 
Administrative officials and judges analyzed the relevant 
precedent, statutory text, and congressional intent to interpret the 
meaning of the seventh subdivision. While this section examines 
each of these bases for decision as separate and distinct, judges and 
administrative officials rarely treated them as independent silos. 
Text was often interpreted in light of congressional intention and 
precedent was viewed as valuable based on its congruence with 
congressional intent.137 Yet independently analyzing the text, 
precedent, and congressional intent clarifies the framework for 
deciding whether Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans 
were eligible to naturalize.  
After approximately eight years of judges and administrative 
officials debating this issue, the Bureau of Naturalization and the 
Department of Justice filed a test case to get a definitive answer.138 
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On May 25, 1925, the Supreme Court decided Toyota v. United 
States and held that Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans 
were not eligible to naturalize pursuant to the 1918 Naturalization 
Act.139 The Court concluded that the limited repeal of section 2169 
only applied to Filipinos.140 This holding was based in large part on 
the Court’s conclusion that “it has long been the national policy to 
maintain the distinction of color and race, radical change is not 
lightly to be deemed to have been intended.”141 
i. Precedent 
Between 1918 and 1925, courts and administrative officials 
did not have the benefit of a Supreme Court decision interpreting 
the 1918 Naturalization Act. Yet relevant precedent existed due to 
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans seeking to naturalize 
pursuant to prior military naturalization fast track statutes.142 At 
the time each of the five fast-track statutes was enacted, section 
2169 was a part of the naturalization law.143  It limited the 
naturalization provisions to “aliens being free white persons, and to 
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”144 The 
military naturalization provisions made no mention of race, and 
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans sought to naturalize 
pursuant to these provisions.145 Between 1862 and 1918, there were 
four published cases in which Asian immigrant servicepersons and 
veterans sought to naturalize pursuant to the military 
naturalization fast track.146 In each of these cases, the petitioners 
had the required military service, but the court was faced with 
determining whether or not section 2169 applied to the military 
naturalization provisions.147 In each of these cases, the courts held 
that section 2169 applied to the military naturalization provisions 
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and thus the Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans were 
ineligible to naturalize.148 
ii. Textual Analysis 
Administrative officials and judges read the text of the 1918 
Naturalization Act to reach one of three conclusions. Either (1) the 
text made Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans eligible to 
naturalize, (2) Filipinos and Puerto Ricans were the only non-White 
and non-Black immigrant servicepersons eligible to naturalize, or 
(3) the text was ambiguous and did not clearly answer the question 
of eligibility.149 Much of the information available about judicial 
decision making on this question is administrative memoranda in 
which naturalization officials report on the decisions of judges 
around the country.  The most detailed textual analyses came from 
Commissioner Campbell and Deputy Commissioner Crist. In 
internal memoranda these two administrative officials present 
detailed arguments for their respective positions based on the text 
of the statute.150 Such analysis from judges is rare because there 
are so few written opinions available, though Judge Vaughan of 
Hawaii did perform a detailed textual analysis.151 
a. Asian Immigrant Servicepersons & Veterans Eligible 
Deputy Commissioner Raymond F. Crist read the 1918 
Naturalization Act as making Asian immigrant servicepersons and 
veterans eligible to naturalize. When the debate initially arose he 
stated, “[t]he language seems to me to be perfectly clear.”152 He 
argued that the limited repeal of section 2169 was to be construed 
as applying to the phrase “any alien” appearing in the seventh 
subdivision.153 In a memo to Commissioner Campbell, he explained 
that: 
[the] question presented is whether the words “any alien 
serving in the military or naval service of the United States 
during the time this country is engaged in the present war,” 
when read in conjunction with the language of section 2 of the 
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same act constitute an exception from the general provisions of 
section 2169, which admits of the naturalization of aliens, 
during military or naval service of the United States during the 
present war, who are not white persons or aliens of African 
nativity or persons of African descent.154 
Deputy Commissioner Crist explained that the text “clearly 
showed that [Congress’] intention was to remove section 2169 of the 
Revised Statutes from consideration in the naturalization of any 
alien embraced within subdivision 7th.”155  He went on to note that 
“[t]his subdivision is an exempting subdivision.  It is the subdivision 
where all of the differing exemptions have been brought together 
and there unified.”156  He emphasized the relationship between the 
use of the phrase “any alien” and the limited repeal of section 2169, 
and concluded the seventh subdivision made all immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans eligible for naturalization by using the 
language “any alien.” While section 2169 generally modified that 
terminology throughout the naturalization statutory provisions, 
Deputy Commissioner Crist argued that it did not in this case. The 
1918 Naturalization Act specifically stated that it did not repeal or 
enlarge any part of 2169, except as specified in the seventh 
subdivision.157 
Judge Vaughan read the text similarly.  Before he began 
hearing naturalization petitions from Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans, Honolulu’s Star Bulletin newspaper 
reported that he believed “this act of May 9, 1918, is an amendment 
to naturalization laws and repeals section 2169.”158  He is reported 
to have explained that “[i]t is evident from the seventh subdivision 
that Congress did not intend to exclude any race from 
naturalization when it passed the law, otherwise, . . . a clause 
would have been inserted dealing separately with those that 
exclusion was intended for.”159  The Star Bulletin concluded, “the 
words ‘any alien’ are taken literally by the judge.”160  Judge 
Vaughan followed this interpretation in the case In re Leon 
Feronda.161  He explained: 
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The seventh subdivision does not mention section 2169, but it 
does authorize the doing of some things that are inconsistent 
with said section.  Considering this fact and the peculiar 
language of this repealing clause, it appears to me that Congress 
intended to make section 2169 inapplicable to cases coming 
within the specification of the seventh subdivision. If this is not 
what the language means I am unable to see what it does 
mean.162 
Three months later, he offered additional analysis regarding 
the relationship between the limited repeal of section 2169 and the 
seventh subdivision.163 Judge Vaughan explained that Congress 
had passed various statutes providing for the naturalization of 
servicepersons and veterans.164  He noted that “in every instance in 
which the question has been before the courts, it has been held that 
section 2169 limited every provision of every such act.”165 
Based on the text, Judge Vaughan concluded section 2169 was 
“repealed or enlarged as specified in the seventh subdivision,” and 
that meant that “the provisions of the seventh subdivision [were 
taken] out of the operation of section 2169.”166 Judge Vaughan 
single handedly naturalized a large portion of the Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans who became United States citizens 
between 1918 and 1925. It is estimated that he naturalized 398 
Japanese immigrant servicepersons, 99 Korean immigrant 
servicepersons, and four Chinese immigrant servicepersons.167 
A number of judges shared this textual reading, including 
Judge Trippet of the United States Federal Court for the District of 
Los Angeles, Judge Hollenbeck, state court judge in Colorado, and 
Judge John B. Zabriskie, state court judge in New Jersey. Each of 
these judges concluded that the text of the 1918 Naturalization Act 
permitted the naturalization of Asian immigrant servicepersons 
and veterans. For example, the Naturalization Examiner for Los 
Angeles reported to the Chief Examiner in San Francisco that 
Judge Trippet “went carefully over the provisions of the law and of 
Section 2169.  He finally gave his opinion that these petitioners 
were eligible under the provisions of the Act, and granted them 
citizenship.”168 Judge Hollenbeck was reported as “[taking] the view 
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that the that the seventh subdivision of Section 4 of the Act of May 
9, 1918 superseded all prior enactments on the subject, especially 
in view of the general repeal embodied in Section 26 of said Act.”169 
Judge Zabriskie “construe[d the] naturalization law of May ninth 
nineteen eighteen to permit the naturalization of Chinese and 
Japanese in military service.”170 
b. Only Filipinos and Puerto Ricans Eligible 
Commissioner Campbell and a number of judges disagreed 
with this reading of the 1918 Naturalization Act. They viewed the 
limited repeal of section 2169 as a necessary provision to effectuate 
the explicit grant of eligibility to Filipino and Puerto Rican 
servicepersons and veterans. Judge Bledsoe of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California was one of 
these judges.171 Judge Bledsoe had an interesting history with 
interpreting the eligibility provisions.  In an October 31, 1919 letter 
to Senator Phelan, Judge Bledsoe explained: 
Upon first reading of the statute, I considered that it entitled 
Japanese to admission and so ruled with respect to the 
individual Japanese then applying. Thereafter, however, upon 
a more careful reading of the statute, rather complex in its 
phraseology, I came to the conclusion that it did not in any way 
affect the right of naturalization as provided for in the general 
law theretofore in force and therefore it did not permit the 
naturalization of Japanese.172 
In 1921, Judge Bledsoe had the opportunity to apply his new 
interpretation of the statute and denied the naturalization 
applications of En Sk Song and Simeon Ogbac Mascarenas.173 Judge 
Bledsoe concluded, “[i]f Congress, in the enactment of subdivision 
7, had intended to make it possible for aliens of every race to become 
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citizens, merely through participation in the war in our Army or 
Navy, it would have been very easy for it to have said so.”174 
Commissioner Campbell had made a similar argument two 
years earlier.  He stated: 
If the act had said ‘any alien, including Japanese, etc.,’ then 
there would have been a specific exception and Japanese would 
have been removed from the excluding terms of section 2169 
. . . . There is no such exception and therefore in lieu of it there 
is pointed out the comprehensive language ‘any alien’ as 
constituting the exception.175 
Yet for Commissioner Campbell, the term “any alien” was 
“general language” that could not create a “specific exception” to 
section 2169 because to do so would make the limited repeal of 
section 2169 “entirely nugatory:”176 
I cannot reconcile it with any authority of which I am aware 
that a legal construction which expunges a specific provision 
from a law and deprives it of all meaning is a correct 
construction, and if the term “any alien” is to be construed in its 
broad literal sense then the Court has denied all significance to 
the language “but nothing in this act shall repeal or in any way 
enlarge section 2169 of the Revised Statutes * * * *.”  This is an 
express provision of the law that is unconditioned and 
independent and must, therefore, be held to be effective. The 
remaining portion of the sentence “* * * * except as specified in 
the seventh subdivision of this act and under the limitation 
therein defined * * * *,” is apparently descriptive of a supposed 
specific exception which a perusal of that part of the section in 
which it apparently should occur fails to disclose.177 
That specific exception was native-born Filipinos. The grant of 
eligibility to native-born Filipinos in the opening sentences of the 
seventh subdivision was: 
an enlargement of section 2169, since a Filipino is an Asiatic 
and of the yellow race, and plainly the language reserving with 
an exception section 2169 R.S. was incorporated for the purpose 
of showing that Congress did not intend any further 
enlargement of its terms to include others than Filipinos and 
even in such case only those Filipinos specified and under the 
limitations as to them which are therein defined.178 
For Commissioner Campbell the issue was “whether ‘any 
alien’ [was] to be broadly interpreted in its literal sense and without 
restriction.”179 He concluded that it was not.  For him, the 
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“inevitable conclusion” was that the 1918 Naturalization Act did 
“not in any ways enlarge nor d[id] it repeal section 2169 R.S., except 
as to native born Filipinos of the designated age and under the 
circumstances defined in the first portion of the seventh 
subdivision.”180 
Judge Kerrigan of the Supreme Court of California agreed: 
[A]fter having said that section 2169 was not to be repealed, it 
was necessary for Congress to add, ‘except,’ etc., because as a 
matter of fact there were two classes mentioned in subdivision 
7, namely Filipinos and Porto Ricans, who were neither free 
white persons nor of African descent or nativity.181 
Judge Van Valkenburg of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri similarly concluded “[t]he 
exceptions referred to must have been the races especially 
mentioned in the seventh subdivision, and the limitation was the 
military or naval service performed.  In other words, under the 
general law, neither a Filipino nor a Porto Rican could necessarily 
have been admitted to citizenship.”182 Judge Wolverton of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
also concluded that the only exception to section 2169 within the 
seventh subdivision was “relat[ed] to native-born Filipinos and to 
Porto Ricans.”183 
Deputy Commissioner Crist rejected this interpretation.  In a 
1921 memo to the Secretary of Labor, Crist stated: 
Section 2169 refers only to “aliens.” It does not have any 
reference whatsoever to “persons owing permanent allegiance,” 
although it has been urged that the reference in this subdivision 
to the Filipino makes the only exception to 2169. The Filipino 
is not an “alien” but a “person owing permanent allegiance to 
the United States.” The provision regarding the Filipino 
specifically excepts him from the general provisions of the 
naturalization law upon service in the navy after the 
declaration of intention, and not from section 2169.184 
Judge Vaughan shared this perspective. In his opinion in In re 
Soon Nahm Ahn, he explained “the provision relating to ‘any native 
Filipino’ is not in conflict with section 2169; the native born Filipino 
is not an alien, and section 2169 has no application to laws 
specifically providing for the naturalization of those who are not 
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aliens.”185 This perspective was ultimately rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Toyota v. United States. There, the Court held that the 
limited repeal of section 2169 only applied to Filipinos. 186 
c. Ambiguous Text 
The administrative archival records include three cases in 
which judges concluded that the text of the 1918 Naturalization Act 
was ambiguous before the Court’s decision in Toyota. In two of these 
cases the judges decided that the ambiguity should be read in favor 
of the Asian servicepersons and veterans seeking naturalization. In 
the remaining case, the judge concluded that ambiguity required an 
examination of Congressional intent, which he decided did not 
support the Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’ 
eligibility. 
Judge Dooling of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California concluded that the text of the 1918 
Naturalization Act was “broad enough to cover” the case of an Asian 
immigrant service member.187 He decided that “any doubt as to the 
meaning of the law should be resolved in favor of those whom the 
Government thought fit to take into active military or naval service 
during the late war.”188 This conclusion was supported by his 
opinion that the court could do this much for “those who were 
willing to fight for this Country, during the late war.”189 Judge P.C. 
Evans, a state court judge in Utah, agreed with Judge Dooling’s 
sentiments. The Acting Chief Naturalization Examiner reported 
that Judge Evans stated “the law should be interpreted to permit 
[Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’] naturalization if 
such interpretation was at all permissible.”190 It appears he did find 
this interpretation permissible because he granted the 
naturalization petition of Hideo Kazuta.191  Kazuta was a Japanese 
native and honorably discharged solider.192 Judge Evan’s reading of 
the 1918 Naturalization Act was shaped by his belief that “a 
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Japanese who had voluntarily entered our military forces and 
served honorably during the late war was entitled to the benefits of 
citizenship.”193 It does not appear that either judge was willing to 
ignore the statutory text to reach this outcome, but rather that both 
were persuaded that the text did not clearly answer the question. 
In light of such ambiguity, it was possible for Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans to get the benefit of the doubt.194 
Judge Kerrigan of the Supreme Court of California similarly 
read the statute as ambiguous, but in the face of ambiguity he 
turned to congressional intent.195  Based on an analysis of 
legislative history Judge Kerrigan concluded Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans were not eligible to naturalize.196  
Judge Kerrigan specifically pointed to the fact that “the committee 
which reported the bill to Congress, in response to questions from 
the floor, repeatedly said that the act would not apply to those not 
capable of citizenship.”197 
iii. Congressional Intent 
Administrative officials and judges gave considerable weight 
to their understanding of whether Congress intended to make Asian 
immigrant servicepersons and veterans eligible for naturalization 
through the 1918 Naturalization Act. Opinions on this issue were 
split at the highest levels within the Bureau of Naturalization.198  
Commissioner Richard K. Campbell concluded that section 2169 
prohibited Asian immigrant servicepersons’ and veterans’ 
naturalization, while Deputy Commissioner Crist believed that 
such naturalization was permitted. Both gentlemen had been 
actively involved in the enactment of U.S. naturalization law. 
Commissioner Campbell was one of three members of the 
Presidential Commission on Naturalization in 1905. This 
commission drafted legislation that became the 1906 Act. The main 
purpose of the 1906 Act was to centralize naturalization procedures, 
but both of the proposed bills submitted by the Commission 
recommended limiting naturalization to “persons of the Caucasian 
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race and to aliens of African nativity or descent.”199 Commissioner 
Campbell’s commitment to racial requirements for naturalization 
in 1905, which excluded Asian immigrants, may have influenced his 
interpretation of the 1918 Naturalization Act that amended the 
1906 Naturalization Act.  Commissioner Campbell noted that a 
committee hearing before the passage of the 1918 Naturalization 
Act “bears out” the idea that the section 2169 repeal was limited to 
Filipinos.200  He thought it was obvious that “Congress believed that 
there was some respect in which section 2169 of the Revised 
Statutes would be operative in regard to the new matter adopted on 
behalf of aliens who had been engaged in the present military 
service of the United States, otherwise the reservation would have 
been futile.”201 
Deputy Commissioner Crist was involved in the drafting of the 
1918 amendments and testified before Congress about them.202 
Based on his involvement, he concluded “[t]he intention of Congress 
was to make eligible for citizenship any alien who could be prevailed 
upon during its greatest historical crisis to enter the military or 
naval service of the United States.”203  Further, that “there were 
others than white or black aliens [in the Army] was generally 
understood.  It was known that there were Chinese, Japanese, 
Hindus, Filipinos, American Indians, and others ineligible 
ordinarily to naturalize under the naturalization laws of this 
country.”204 Section 2169 was “freely discussed on the floor of the 
House,” and Deputy Commissioner Crist argued that Congress’ 
“intention was to remove section 2169 of the Revised Statutes from 
consideration in the naturalization of any alien embraced within 
subdivision 7.”205 
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Commissioner Campbell and Deputy Commissioner Crist both 
had supporters within the judiciary. For example, Judge Bledsoe 
and Judge Van Valkenburg agreed with Commissioner Campbell. 
Judge Bledsoe concluded: 
The purpose of Congress . . . was not to provide for admission of 
aliens generally, who had served with us in the World War, but 
merely to provide that those of them who were otherwise 
eligible to admission might be admitted without being required 
to execute the usual preliminary declaration, and without 
completing the usual period of residence within the confines of 
the United States.206 
Judge Van Valkenburg similarly concluded that “[t]he history 
of legislation upon this subject convincingly demonstrates the 
purpose of Congress to limit applicants for naturalization to free 
white persons and those of African nativity and descent.”207 
Judge Vaughan offered the most detailed discussion of 
congressional intent, which corresponded with Deputy 
Commissioner Crist’s conclusions. Judge Vaughan explained: 
We had drafted them into our service and they had thought 
enough of us to serve, to risk their lives for us. Was Congress 
unwilling to grant citizenship to those among them found to 
possess the qualifications required of others? I do not think so. 
In my opinion, Congress by repealing the clause quoted above 
lifted section 2169 so as to admit them to citizenship.208 
He concluded that Congress intended to treat all alien 
servicepersons and veterans equally, stating “[i]f it was not the 
intention of Congress thereby to provide equal treatment, or at least 
fair treatment for all aliens in our service, I am unable to perceive 
what Congress did inten[d].”209 In a subsequent case he reiterated 
this conclusion stating, “[e]vidently Congress intended to provide 
for extending the protection of citizenship to them without regard 
to race or color.”210 
A detailed review of the legislative history for the 1918 
Naturalization Act reveals that members of Congress expressed 
grave concern that the military naturalization provisions would 
enable Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans to naturalize. 
When members of Congress expressed such concerns, they were 
constantly reassured that no such outcome was possible. For 
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example, Representative Moore of Pennsylvania asked how the 
military naturalization provisions would “apply in the case of a 
Chinaman or a Japanese. The term ‘any alien’ there is pretty broad. 
It applies to a Filipino in the service. Is it possible it would apply 
also to a Chinaman or a Jap?”211 Representative John L. Burnett of 
Alabama assured Representative Moore that the military fast track 
did not “repeal the existing law which excludes Chinese and 
Japanese from citizenship.”212 Still not entirely convinced, 
Representative Moore wondered whether it would be possible for an 
Asian immigrant “to obtain a foothold in the Army and make that 
the medium of becoming a citizen under this section.”213  
Representative Hayes replied, “the purpose of this, of course, is to 
admit Porto Ricans and Filipinos who are in the Army to apply for 
commissions in order to have an official position in the various 
Filipino and Porto Rican contingents of the Army. That is the 
primary purpose of it.”214  Representative Burnett added, “[i]t would 
not apply to those who are not capable of acquiring citizenship.”215  
During House hearings on an earlier bill that had language similar 
to that of the 1918 Naturalization Act, Representative Burnett, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, asked, “[a]re there any Asiatics that are not eligible 
for citizenship who are serving in any capacity on ships, and if so, 
would this bill in its broad terms allow them to come in?”216  Deputy 
Commissioner Crist replied, “I understand the Navy Department 
allows no one in the Navy who is not a citizen of the United States, 
with the exception of the Filipino and Porto Rican.”217 After 
Chairman Burnett sought greater clarification, Representative 
Sabath explained,“[i]t was not intended that we naturalize 
Japanese or Chinese, but it is intended that we should naturalize 
as many of the seaman as we can.”218  Deputy Commissioner Crist 
finally stated, “[t]he Chinese could not be naturalized, because by a 
specific act of Congress they are excluded.”219 He then proceeded to 
quote section three of the bill, which stated, “[t]hat all acts of parts 
of acts inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this act 
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are hereby repealed; but nothing in this act shall repeal or in any 
way enlarge section 2169 of the Revised Statutes.”220 Chairman 
Burnett replied, “That probably guards it” to which Deputy 
Commissioner Crist stated, “That guards it.”221  Finally, a Senate 
report on the bill that was enacted explained: 
[The bill] also declares that nothing in the act shall enlarge or 
repeal in any way section 2169 of the Revised Statutes except 
as specified in the seventh subdivision and under the limitation 
therein defined.  This means that Filipinos may be naturalized 
who are enlisted in the Army or Navy of the United States and 
are honorably discharged therefrom.222 
The repeated reassurance that the seventh subdivision only 
expanded naturalization eligibility to Filipinos and Puerto Ricans 
was due to the text of the bill.  The bill stated “[t]hat all Acts or 
parts of Acts inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this 
Act are hereby repealed; but nothing in this Act shall repeal or in 
any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the 
Revised Statutes.”223  Yet the text ultimately adopted was different, 
and it included the limited repeal language. In both forums, the 
same concerns were raised and the same reassurances were given, 
despite different texts being considered. 
 In Toyota, the Supreme Court examined congressional intent 
and concluded that “[t]he legislative history of the act indicates that 
the intention of Congress was not to enlarge section 2169, except in 
respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified service.”224 The Court 
concluded that Congress did not extend to Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans the same presumptions about cultural 
assimilation that it extended to non-Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans.225 Their military service could not 
overcome a presumption of unassimibility.226 
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Before Toyota was decided, lower federal and state court 
judges had different opinions about Congress’ intent.227 While there 
is no record of judges or administrative officials demeaning the 
military service of Asian immigrants, some decision makers exalted 
this service and viewed it as evidence of the characteristics desired 
for future citizens.228 For these decision makers, there was likely no 
legitimate basis for distinguishing between Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans and non-Asian immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans. Consequently, they concluded that 
Congress could not have meant to make such a distinction. For 
example, Deputy Commissioner Crist noted: 
To construe this statute adversely to the solider because of his 
nationality, race or creed is to repudiate those upon whom the 
Nation has leaned and depended to sustain the fundamentals 
upon which its national life exists.  A policy of repudiation of 
the solider of the country must bring about just rebuke.229 
Yet other decision makers concluded that Congress intended 
to maintain the racial distinctions that existed before the 1918 
Naturalization Act.230  These decision makers thought Congress 
viewed Asian immigrants as having different and incompatible 
values, norms, and practices—thus making them unassimilable. 
In Toyota, however, the Supreme Court examined 
congressional intent and concluded that “[t]he legislative history of 
the act indicates that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge 
section 2169, except in respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified 
service.”231 The Court concluded that Congress did not extend to 
Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans the same 
presumptions about cultural assimilation that it extended to non-
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Asian immigrant servicepersons and veterans.232 Their military 
service could not overcome the presumption of unassimibility. 233 
Conclusion 
Many Asian immigrants believed that military service would 
enable them to demonstrate their loyalty and adoption of 
mainstream American values, norms, and practices.234  The special 
provisions within the naturalization laws for immigrant 
servicepersons and veterans supported their belief.  Like many 
immigrants, Asian immigrants viewed military service as “some 
indication of the feeling of loyalty expressed . . . towards the country 
of their adoption.”235 Further, “most Asian men apparently joined 
the armed forces in the same rush of enthusiasm stirring other 
Americans and alien residents and with the added hope that 
demonstrations of loyal wartime service would be a path to social 
acceptance and incorporation.”236 For example, Kiichi Kanzaki, the 
general secretary of the Japanese Association of America, saw the 
war as an opportunity for Asian immigrants to demonstrate their 
assimilation, to “dislodge the ‘theory that the Japanese are so 
unshakably devoted and faithful to their country that they will 
never become loyal American citizens.’”237 
Kanzaki’s desire to prove Japanese immigrants’ cultural 
assimilation was not simply intended to change the hearts and 
minds of the American public. Rather, it was to demonstrate a legal 
requirement for citizenship. The racial requirements embedded in 
naturalization laws were an example of categorical decision making 
rather than individualized assessments. 
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The categorical approach creates a serious risk that 
individuals who have internalized American culture will be denied 
the opportunity to naturalize. This risk is particularly pronounced 
when the categories do not provide accurate and reliable 
information. As long as assimilation is evaluated via categorical 
criteria rather than individualized assessments, it is a problematic 
citizenship requirement.238 It is critically important that applicants 
have the opportunity for individualized review of their specific life 
story to determine whether they have internalized American 
culture. 
United States citizenship requirements are no longer defined 
by race or demonstrated “habits of civilized life.” But concerns about 
cultural assimilation continue to shape public and political 
discourse about who should be eligible to naturalize.239 As a 
category, unauthorized migrants are unable to become citizens 
because they lack lawful permanent residence status.240 Proposals 
for a pathway to citizenship are rooted in the idea that these 
individuals “are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every 
single way but one: on paper.”241 Advocates for a pathway to 
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citizenship argue for individualized assessments to demonstrate 
that unauthorized migrants deserve access to United States 
citizenship because of their values, norms, and practices.242 
Opponents argue that these individuals’ failure to abide by U.S. 
immigration law demonstrates that they have not internalized 
American culture.243 As long as culture remains an implicit 
citizenship requirement, decision makers will struggle with 
whether or not category-based criteria or individual assessments 
provide the right balance between accurate and reliable decision 
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